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Abstract 
 
Anthea Roberts’ ambitious monograph, Is International Law International?, calls on 
international lawyers to suspend our universalist pretensions and reflect from the perspective 
of different communities of international lawyers, conceived instead as a ‘divisible college’. 
Her innovative and contemporary empirical work – on the educational and discursive 
practices across the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – 
represents nothing less than a first stab at a sociology of the international legal profession. 
In doing so, Roberts has adopted a consciously descriptive approach, with all of the 
consequences entailed thereby. Moreover, her privileging of certain methods and the focus 
on the five veto-wielding powers has the potential to reproduce the very power imbalances 
that she seeks to illuminate and possibly to challenge. Finally, an important counterpoint to 
the divisibility of the international legal profession is that, however limited we are, we 
nevertheless remain united by certain other tenets – in particular, our shared understanding 
of what concepts and ideas find purchase on the international plane and our engagement 
with, commitment to, or resistance to these concepts and ideas. The ties that bind our 
epistemic community might be obscured by undue emphasis on our profession as a divisible 
college. 
 
1 Confessions of an Insider 
 
Anthea Roberts’ Is International Law International? is hugely ambitious. More about the 
profession of international lawyers than the actual substance of international law, it is a book 
that aims to open the eyes of the profession to the hegemonic dimensions of our craft, 
identifying the social situatedness of the international legal order in which we operate. The 
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thrust of Roberts’ argument is that the purported universality of international law and 
international lawyers is a fallacy; only by understanding international law through the 
patterns of ‘difference’ and ‘dominance’ that characterize the profession can we understand it 
as a social process. This is a bold claim, but she does not stand alone; as Martti 
Koskenniemi’s enthusiastic foreword foretells, ‘[i]nternational law did not descend from the 
sky to settle our conflicts or to provide a “neutral framework” for our debates. Its rules and 
institutions, ideas and symbols, its cultural and professional mores bear the history of a 
divided and unjust world’.1 Roberts’ book is no more and no less than an attempt to map out 
how these differences and divergences shape today’s international law. 
A brief summary of the book’s structure can help to capture a flavour of Roberts’ 
overall argument, which favours a comparative approach in surveying the understanding of 
‘international’ across different national jurisdictions and traditions. The first part of the book 
is dedicated to an analysis of ‘patterns of difference’, examining the structures and 
institutions of selected jurisdictions (primarily, but not exclusively, those of the five 
permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council). Roberts focuses, in 
particular, on the composition of elite law faculties and the approaches taken in educational 
textbooks in those jurisdictions in order to identify these patterns of difference, drawing 
several conclusions about the preponderance of Western sources and influence in both 
Western and non-Western jurisdictions. The second part of her book seeks to illuminate 
‘patterns of dominance’ – in particular, the outsized influence of the West – to suggest how 
Western conceptions of international law are denationalized and put forward as the 
‘universal’ or, at the very least, the ‘globalized’ and the extent to which this is accepted even 
by non-Western states. In the third and final part, Roberts imagines the extent to which a shift 
in global power away from the West and especially towards Russia and China might produce 
challenges to Western ideational hegemony, looking at recent disputes in which such 
challenges have arisen. 
Is International Law International? is replete with anecdotes and detail about our 
profession as a whole and individuals in our profession that are only really intelligible to 
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1 A. Roberts, Is International Law International? (2017), at xvi. 
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other genuine insiders.2 To give but one example, Roberts points to the extent to which elite 
international law academics in the USA have held posts in the US government, whether at the 
National Security Council, the Department of Defense or the Department of State.3 Such a 
finding, if indicative of a global tendency, is potentially discomfiting to our professional 
identity: ‘International lawyers often see themselves as outsiders, crusaders of principle, of 
unfashionable virtue, and they have generally found it hard to accept that their tools and 
concepts may be open to challenge on the basis that that they create another class of 
outsiders.’4 Partly confessional, partly a warning, Roberts’ ambitious monograph seeks to 
shatter that stylized image of the international lawyer as the champion of universality, instead 
depicting the international lawyer as simultaneously beholden both to a wider transnational 
field, and equally, to national traditions and their distinct approaches towards international 
law. Though, at times, some of Roberts’ conclusions feel like ‘hunches’ picked up along the 
way,5 one senses that Roberts’ primary aim is to hold a mirror to our profession from the 
perspective of a consummate insider; it is a call for self-reflection.  
From the outset, Roberts advances two refreshingly honest caveats about her methods. 
First, conceding her lack of social science expertise, she maintains that some of the cross-
national differences remain so striking that they justify simplicity. Her empirical work aims 
merely to illustrate her argument with concrete observations so as to remove the sense that 
they are too abstract for the reader. There is truth to this; many of the observations that 
Roberts has endeavoured to justify empirically – in particular, certain patterns of 
Westernization or the preponderance of Europeans and North Americans within the staff of 
international institutions – are obvious to any member of the ‘invisible college’. Second, 
Roberts’ overarching goal is decidedly modest; she aspires ‘to create a framework of analysis 
that can be used as a platform for others to delve more deeply into some of the particulars … 
to confirm, correct, or add nuance to the story I tell’.6 This framework of analysis is 
supported by abundant empirical evidence to support what would normally be intuitions, in 
particular, in the detailed appendices that help the inquisitive reader to glimpse the 
underlying data upon which this study was built. In this respect, Roberts’ work makes a 
                                                 
2 A more light-hearted example would be the talk delivered at the European Society of International Law’s 2010 
Conference in Cambridge by Roger O’Keefe, ‘Once Upon a Time There Was a Gap’, which was later published 
on EJIL:Talk (8 December 2010). 
3 Roberts, supra note 1, at 114. 
4 H. Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Critiques of International Law and Their Critics,’ Third World Legal Studies 
(1994–95), at 1. 
5 H. Ruiz-Fabri, ‘From Babel to Esperanto and Back Again: The Fate of International Law (or of International 
Lawyers?),’ EJIL:Talk! (8 February 2018). 
6 Roberts, supra note 1, at 48. 
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valuable contribution to our understanding of the field. Many of the factors identified by 
Roberts reflecting diverging approaches to international law are both mutually productive and 
self-reinforcing, thus strongly suggesting that international law is the product and the 
outcome of the practices of the international legal profession.  
Roberts’ call for disciplinary self-knowing is welcome in a profession where politics 
and ideology continually recur beneath the surface of international legal argument; Orfeas 
Chasapis Tassinis has likened it to the self-reflexivity called for in a famous dialogue 
between Socrates and Alcibiades.7 Indeed, there are several ‘selves’, or audiences, in 
Roberts’ project. The first is herself, of course; she situates herself as a Westerner, a native 
English speaker from Australia who has worked and taught in the USA and the United 
Kingdom (UK), without fluency in other languages. Roberts’ move is redolent of how social 
scientists ‘situate’ themselves, declaring their gender identity, sexual orientation or ethnicity, 
and it subjectivizes our professional endeavour, suggesting that our diverse perspectives and 
backgrounds partially constitute our engagement with international law. And it has 
methodological implications as, by her own admission, Roberts could not always engage with 
the primary materials herself, instead drawing on networks of students and communications 
so as better to understand what was occurring at other universities and jurisdictions, 
especially those outside her areas of expertise and linguistic fluency.8 If nothing else 
resonates from this book, this is an important message. 
The ‘second self’ is the professional community of international lawyers, who are the 
primary addressees of her call for greater self-awareness. We international lawyers are at the 
heart of one of her chief claims; according to her, we ‘typically’ sit at the intersection of two 
communities: ‘a transnational community of international lawyers and a domestic community 
of national lawyers’.9 Breaking from Oscar Schachter’s metaphor of the ‘invisible college’, 
Roberts instead conceives of the profession as a ‘divisible college’, ‘whose members hail 
from different states and regions and often form separate, though sometimes overlapping, 
communities with their own understandings and approaches, as well as their own distinct 
influences and spheres of influence’.10 The idea is alluring, conveying simultaneously a 
fragile unity and the inherent pluralism of today’s international lawyers: ‘[A] dynamic 
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International Law International?’, 7 Cambridge International Law Journal (2018) 185. 
8 Roberts, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
9 Ibid., at 6. 
10 Ibid., at 2, 52. 
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interplay between the centripetal search for unity and universality and the centrifugal pull of 
national and regional differences.’11 Yet the ‘divisible college’ as metaphor also has its own 
limitations and blind spots, to which I shall return later. 
Finally, there is a third self – international law itself – in regard to its nature, reach 
and character as law; as Chasapis Tassinis suggests, it is the ‘central background context 
against which the self-reflection is supposed to take place’.12 Is international law abstract or 
contextual; is it universal or can it be nationalized? As the object of our professional 
engagement, it is the ‘magic stuff’ that potentially binds us as a vocation. By emphasizing our 
divergences and distinctions, therefore, Roberts’ underlying claim is that international law 
cannot be universal, itself irremediably divided through the divergences that characterize the 
profession. Roberts seems to be following Anne Orford’s exhortation to investigate the ways 
in which international lawyers’ understanding of the world ‘can contribute to making that 
representation of the world seem real or natural’.13 This has important implications on her 
methodological choices and, above all, on the emphasis on description that permeates the 
book. 
 
2 On Empiricism and ‘Deep Description’ 
 
Roberts’ ‘Project Design’, outlined in Chapter 2, is a clear articulation of the ‘comparative 
international law’ approach she favours and has been developing: the notion that 
understanding international law also depends on one’s vantage point. This is effected through 
a very contemporary presentation, including charts, tables and even the trendy ‘word clouds’ 
in US and UK textbooks!14 Roberts’ comparative international law approach comes with an 
important caveat; for her, differences in the way international law is understood, interpreted, 
applied and approached can be examined without adopting a relativist stance to the effect that 
all different positions are equal: ‘[A] descriptive observation that certain international law 
values are not universal as a matter of origin, or universally accepted as a matter of 
sociological fact, does not necessitate a normative position that these values should not be 
recognized as universally applicable’.15 With respect to methodology, it raises the question of 
                                                 
11 Ibid., at 3. 
12 Chasapis Tassinis, supra note 7, at 187. 
13 Orford, ‘Embodying Internationalism: The Making of International Lawyers’, 19 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law (1998) 1, at 16. 
14 Roberts, supra note 1, at 148–149. 
15 Ibid., at 21. 
6 
what evaluative standpoint to take on competing notions within such a framework. Can one 
really say that the comparative international law project is primarily one of description? 
Grand theories about mapping international law as a field aside (which I do think have a 
degree of purchase), I am not entirely convinced that it is hugely original to suggest that 
international law’s aspiration to universality is but an aspiration, one that is limited by the 
localisms of all of its localized agents. Roberts consciously embraces what Paul Stephan calls 
‘thick description’, the idea that description is necessary to challenge preconceptions and, 
‘when well done as here, prior to any instrumental analysis’.16 Interestingly, Stephan 
concedes the paradox that such description raises: ‘What deep description does not do ‒ 
indeed, it cannot do ‒ is create a normative framework for assessing particular regimes. It 
removes the underbrush to allow the observer to better comprehend the social phenomena in 
play, but it does not supply the framework for evaluation.’17  
A point that Stephan does not acknowledge, but is very much evident from my 
reading of Roberts’ book, is that such deep description does set up the foundations for a more 
explicitly normativist approach, and the very choice of sources and methods may point the 
way to a specific path towards reform. It is a sort of ‘covert normativism’18 that marks out 
Roberts’ approach and comes to the fore at several junctures, as will be explained later. In 
this respect, Roberts’ consciously descriptive methodology is markedly more confined than 
ostensibly similar descriptive work from Orford, who sought to draw from historical social 
practices and the way they are rationalized, reflected and transformed into conceptual 
frameworks, using the case study of the ‘responsibility-to-protect’ doctrine and its historical 
precursors.19 Although similar in their engagement with facts and their reflections on the 
importance of description, Roberts and Orford depart on a key point. Where Roberts’ 
emphasis on deep description suggests that it is prior to normativist projects that others might 
pursue based on her methodology, Orford sought to demonstrate how normativist projects 
often preceded conceptual frameworks that are used as ex post facto justification for material 
reality. Orford drew her argument on Michel Foucault’s reinterpretation of the emergence of 
the modern state form in Europe, in which governmental practices were later developed, and 
justified, through concepts like sovereignty or statehood. As such, the state was hardly a 
                                                 
16 Stephan, ‘On Is International Law International? – Where Next?’, Opinio Juris (8 February 2018). 
17 Ibid. 
18 I owe this term to Christian Tams, book review editor at the European Journal of International Law (EJIL). 
Roberts’ strategy in this regard has also been noticed in Chasapis Tassinis, supra note 7, at 189, who suggests 
that the self-reflection exercise is ‘inherently normative’. 
19 Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, 25 Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL) (2012) 609. 
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‘natural-historical given’ or a ‘cold monster’ but, rather, ‘the correlative of a particular way 
of governing’.20 In short, social relations and practices begat legal concepts that emerged to 
justify these relations, and not the other way around, and Roberts’ emphasis on description 
and empiricism as being prior to such normativist projects struck me as somewhat ahistorical. 
Moreover, Roberts’ embrace of a comparativist lens also adopts a covertly politicized 
methodology, and in this respect, it must be said that Roberts is too coy about her mission in 
writing this book. Throughout, after providing the empirical data, which may be limited but is 
often extremely compelling, she refrains from explaining how the insights drawn from the 
disparate methods used can be synthesized coherently. There is an oscillation, on the one 
hand, between describing international law as Westernizing and globalizing (and in that 
limited way, constructing a universal frame); and, on the other hand, suggesting that there is 
an overreliance on representation and a false sense of universality. Yet, throughout, Roberts 
takes no firm position despite observing clear Westernizing tendencies, especially the over-
representation of Western legal professionals in international institutions or as advocates, 
which brings to the surface ‘the tension between her descriptive thesis and her self-reflective 
rigour’.21 If such practices reflect international law’s structural bias, this would not be 
Roberts’ explicit position; she leads the reader right to the conclusion, but she does not make 
it herself.  
 
3 The Agenda: ‘Comparative International Law’ 
 
 ‘Comparative international law’ as a methodology is clearly on the rise, with Roberts at its 
vanguard.22 To her mind, this means challenging the purported universality of our field by 
‘disrupting’ the understanding that international lawyers are a coherent and universal field 
and demonstrating that we are differentiated according to how we are socialized into the 
discipline, the networks in which we participate and the sources on which we rely that 
reinforce these constraints. Comparativism has a long pedigree in our field. As Ignacio de la 
Rasilla demonstrates in his recent history of international law journals published in this 
                                                 
20 Ibid., at 616, citing M. Foucault, translated by G. Burchell, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège 
de France 1978–79 (2008), at 2. 
21 Chasapis Tassinis, supra note 7, at 190, who calls on Roberts to explain what would be ‘inherently bad’ with 
this over-reliance on Western materials. 
22 See Roberts et al., ‘Comparative International Law: Framing the Field’, 109 American Journal of 
International Law (2015) 467; A. Roberts et al. (eds), Comparative International Law (2018). 
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journal, comparativism has a long-standing and well-established methodology through which 
to understand international law.23 And it should not surprise us that international legal 
scholars, from their diverse national settings, would seek to understand international law 
through their experience of what was traditionally associated with the concept of ‘law’.24 But 
international law is not merely a ‘thing’ or a ‘form’; if we are to take the lessons of the last 
three decades seriously, international law is also a practice of argument, one that takes place 
and is performed within a relatively confined range of people who communicate with one 
another using the grammar and syntax of international law.25 If internationalism is a feature 
of that community, it also carries with it its own presumptions about international lawyers as 
a unified professional community bound by a body of doctrine, common history and 
languages across national cultures or legal traditions.26 Internationalism in this respect 
connotes disciplinary service to the project of international law itself, one that connotes ‘an 
erasure of particularist projects’, as David Kennedy would put it.27 Internationalism places 
the emphasis on the universal, the general and not the particular; it glosses over the diversity 
of perspectives and inherent pluralism of the global citizenry. 
Comparativism, in Roberts’ frame, highlights the diversity within that community; in 
the conclusion, she proclaims that ‘consciously assuming a comparative international law 
approach may help international lawyers to look at their field through different eyes and from 
different perspectives, enabling them to understand others more fully and to critique 
themselves and their own state more perceptively’.28 But does that mean that international 
lawyers should transform themselves into comparativists? Can comparativism be reduced to a 
methodological lens to accept the potential of multiple approaches to the phenomenon that 
we call ‘law’? Or is it no more than a call for understanding law as a contextualized cultural 
                                                 
23 De la Rasilla, ‘A Very Short History of International Law Journals (1869–2018)’, 29 EJILbnu (2018) 137. 
24 Kennedy, ‘The Disciplines of International Law and Policy’, 12 LJIL (1999) 9, at 18. 
25 The notion of an international law ‘grammar’ is drawn from Dupuy, ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique 
international: Cours général de droit international public’, 297 Recueil des Cours (2002) 9, at 205: ‘[U]n 
internationaliste ne devrait jamais prétendre à autre chose que d’être un bon grammarien du langage normatif 
du droit international’. I have written on this elsewhere. See Hernández, ‘The Responsibility of the International 
Legal Academic: Situating the “Grammarian” in the Invisible College’, in A. Nollkaemper et al. (eds), 
International Law as a Profession (2017) 160. 
26 Kennedy, supra note 24, at 17. 
27 Ibid., at 86. 
28 Roberts, supra note 1, at 321; see also her caution: ‘[I]f international lawyers operate in silos, either 
domestically or transnationally, they risk failing to connect with, and understand the perspectives of, those 
coming from diverse backgrounds and holding different perspectives’ (at 323). 
9 
phenomenon?29 Such a call is itself not normatively innocent; the comparativist pursues his 
or her own political project, in which pluralism is privileged over the global and difference is 
emphasized over commonality. Yet, for all of this, both internationalism and comparativism 
share a broader purpose: to defend the integrity, autonomy and flexibility of international law 
to retain its status as law and, thereby, to provide precisely the ‘rational and pragmatic 
machinery for practical government’.30 As Kennedy puts it, ‘[i]n the legal academy, if 
international law is the department of global governance, comparativists serve as a 
department of diversity. In differentiating themselves from governance by engaging with 
culture while asserting that culture can be understood without being ruled, comparativists 
reinforce the internationalist’s claim to govern from a space beyond culture’.31  
The tension between internationalism and comparativism can be simplified thus: if 
internationalism seeks to de-emphasize cultural differences, the focus of comparativism is to 
study these cultural distinctions and how they manifest themselves in the law. As methods, 
they complement one another, allowing us to discern which cultural distinctions are relevant 
and to understand how culture and society constitute legal orders and are, in turn, constituted 
by one another.32 However, comparativism as a methodology for understanding international 
law also has its limitations. Roberts’ emphasis on national distinctions suggest a strong 
relationship between law, culture and society, but, at the same time, it can over-emphasize 
cultural distinctions and the fact that pluralism itself is a normative project. As discussed 
earlier, the ambivalence with which Roberts has presented a ‘descriptive’ thesis about the 
sociology of the international legal profession was one of studied neutrality or a ‘thick 
description’. The methodology of comparativism connotes not only empirical description but 
also a number of normative conclusions – in particular, the rebuttal of both substantive and 
potential universality. Although Roberts correctly chastises international law and 
international lawyers for a failure to achieve universality, I was not fully convinced that the 
‘comparative international law’ approach genuinely provides a corrective or simply imposes, 
in the guise of description, a different normative framework based on pluralism. If the latter 
                                                 
29 Ruiz-Fabri quotes Muir Watt, ‘La fonction subversive du droit comparé’, 52 Revue internationale de droit 
comparé (2000) 503, suggesting ‘comparison is …capable of freeing legal thought from inhibiting conceptual 
constraints by paving the way to new ways of reading the law’.  
30 Kennedy, supra note 21, at 82. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Kennedy, ‘International Legal Education’, 26 Harvard International Law Journal (HILJ) (1985) 361, at 380: 
‘By examining the process of differentiation in this way, it is possible to develop a renewed sense of connection, 
renouncing the mechanisms of social division as well as disciplinary specialization.’ 
10 
is true, then comparative international law is a call for a different emphasis within 
international legal argument, without refashioning international law itself. The focus of 
international law is reduced to nothing more than ‘a normative restatement of the wills, 
claims, and commitments of sovereigns, confirming, enshrining, recognizing sovereigns and 
registering their prerogatives’.33 International law begins to resemble nothing more than a 
realist instrument used by powerful actors rather than being considered an instrument that 
itself wields immense normative force.  
Finally, in the guise of seeking knowledge about human behaviour and culture, 
pluralism and the comparativist approach to international law can potentially obscure the 
centrifugal, unifying facets of international legal argument. Roberts’ emphasis on 
Westernizing, globalizing factors and core periphery dynamics is a welcome addition to 
comparativist approaches to international law, but the concern remains that essentializing 
differences and diversity might eclipse those aspects of international law that remain a 
coherent unit – those aspects that are not fragmented. My view remains that whilst 
international lawyers may speak in different accents or dialects, ultimately we speak the same 
language, and that language is a reflection and instrument of power relations on the global 
plane. To be able to master that language is to master the discipline as a ‘body’, however 
heterogeneous, of knowledge; as Orford would put it, the mastery of that language is ‘to be 
able to perform its genres, to speak and write and embody its favourite discourses, myths, and 
narratives’.34 Understanding the ‘prestige’ accents or dialects within that diverse, but unified, 
college merits further emphasis, an emphasis that can be lost in a sweeping comparativist 
approach. I will return to this later. 
 
4 The Reproduction of Power Imbalances 
 
Roberts’ study raises another important concern, one that is perhaps unavoidable given the 
nature and scope of the book, but one that ought not to be brushed aside. Despite her 
insistence on a comparative and diverse approach, her empirical observations are confined for 
the most part to studying the international legal profession in the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council (the P5) and in a few other comparators that are useful to her, such 
as her native jurisdiction of Australia. Roberts’ privileging of the P5 states has certain 
                                                 
33 Kennedy, supra note 24, at 81. 
34 Orford, supra note 11, at 3. 
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consequences, as it also underlies her analysis of universities, of textbooks (and citation 
practices within them) and of other strategic and methodological choices; in short, it 
structures the entire book.  
Roberts gamely tries to justify her focus on the P5 states through a combination of 
arguments ranging from their institutional prominence on the UN Security Council and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), their economic prowess, their engagement in the global 
flow of students and their relatively privileged status overall.35 She does concede that no 
Latin American or African state is represented (including the Middle East), that major 
language groups such as Spanish, German, Japanese or Arabic are excluded and that ‘new’ 
powers such as India, Mexico, Indonesia and Nigeria are not represented. Other jurisdictions 
remain marginal or purely ornamental. Yet, overall, this acknowledgement does not serve as 
much of an apology for the core-periphery paradox that is of her own making;36 though 
Roberts seeks to illuminate that powerful states and their nationals, especially the Western 
states on the UN Security Council (France, the UK, and the USA) constitute a ‘core’ within 
the international legal profession, her own choice of focus does nothing except reinforce 
those dynamics. She does no more than to acknowledge the limitations and then suggest that 
the study ought to be broadened.37  
Doubtless, the monograph would become too unwieldy otherwise, but this felt a bit 
disappointing, and the core-periphery and power relations that it exposes creates a further 
tension in her book that merits exploration. Although there is a realist pragmatism in her 
emphasis on the permanent members of the UN Security Council and their leading role 
within the international legal order, she reinforces in so doing the privileged status of these 
countries and gives off the impression that these are the only states that actually matter. 
Subconsciously, this potentially reproduces the very power imbalances that Roberts claims 
her comparative approach addresses – these states have strategic interests that diverge 
considerably from the vast majority of states, greater material and even legal means (through 
their veto). After a book’s worth of relatively descriptive empirical analysis, the pragmatic 
                                                 
35 Roberts, supra note 1, at 35–39. 
36 Of course, the very notions of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ are laden with presumptions and are themselves not 
clearly defined; they could refer to economic and geopolitical realities, the colonial-colonized dynamic, intra-
Western dynamics, between the global South and the global North, regional dynamics and even those within 
states. Roberts seems to deploy it at different junctures to distinguish the West from other states but, 
occasionally, also refers to Australia, Canada and South Africa as ‘semi-peripheral’ – for example, in relation to 
textbooks (see, e.g., ibid., at 152). I return to this point in section 6 of this article. 
37 Ibid., at 39. 
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concession at the end of her book that ‘international law reflects international power’38 drily 
reinforces the consciously descriptive, uncritical manner in which Roberts has assessed much 
of the data that she has complied.39 She concedes this readily in her online response to critics: 
 
Just as many readers have felt unsettled reading [the book], so I felt unsettled 
writing it. I coped with that discomfort by seeking to render as balanced a picture 
as I could, typically presenting both sides of issues rather than taking a normative 
stand about which one I thought was preferable. I showed that strengths often 
contain weakness and vice versa. I subjected myself to the same critique as I 
asked my readers to undertake.40  
 
5 Textbooks and Academia: Inculcating International Law 
 
A considerable part of Roberts’ empirical work studies a swathe of textbooks from states 
around the world (with an emphasis on the P5, to be sure) and is geared towards studying 
nationalizing, denationalizing and Westernizing patterns in the citation styles and approaches 
taken in these textbooks. Justifying her focus on textbooks, Roberts contends that 
international law textbooks ‘give a sense of how international law is understood by the 
current generation of international lawyers (output) and communicated to the next generation 
(input) within a given state’.41 As someone who is finalizing a new textbook on international 
law, I find that there is much to be said about the manner in which textbooks frame certain 
issues, emphasize given areas of controversy and, above all, teach students about how to go 
about analysing international law, the sources whence it derives and the relevant actors 
involved.42 Textbooks, and the manner in which they are structured, inculcate the shared 
vocabulary and methodology of our invisible college for the next generation; they set the 
boundaries of relevance, establishing what counts as a valid and acceptable legal argument 
and what does not. As Roberts puts it, ‘[t]he subjects these books focus on and the materials 
                                                 
38 Ibid., at 289. 
39 As Chasapis Tassinis, supra note 7, at 190, points out, the data collected by Roberts could be marshalled from 
a formalist-positivist, idealist or realist perspective to assume entirely different significance, depending on one’s 
conceptual pre-commitments, with distinct methodological consequences. However, he suggests that Roberts’ 
descriptive approach is perhaps redolent of a ‘neorealist’ stance (at 192). 
40 Roberts, ‘Is International Law International? Continuing the Conversation’, Opinio Juris (9 February 2018). 
41 Roberts, supra note 1, at 32, citing C. Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for 
Global Justice (2012), at 90. 
42 G. Hernández, International Law (forthcoming). 
13 
they use communicate powerful messages to students about the field and form an important 
part of the process by which international lawyers are socialized into understanding their 
vocation’.43 They are the ‘base’ reference, and, in this regard, they establish both the 
acceptability of mainstream international legal argument today and set the foundations for 
how it is taught in the future.  
What is more, international law textbooks are highly relevant for international legal 
practice, being potentially as popular with practitioners, international courts and legal 
advisors to states as they are with students, precisely given their educational, descriptive 
approach. By avoiding a polemical analysis and complex theoretical questions, they account 
for existing legal developments within structures intelligible by the profession as a whole, 
framing how international lawyers describe and account for international law. In analysing a 
range of textbooks from the P5 and a few beyond, Roberts carefully and methodically selects 
a range of metrics ranging from citation to primary sources, national and international case 
law, treaties, theory and doctrine with an aim to seeing what sorts of sources are privileged 
and whether certain patterns prevail depending on the origin of the textbook. Substantively, 
the structures of the books were studied, looking, for example, at the divergence between 
Western and non-Western approaches to a textbook. There were some interesting anecdotal 
conclusions; Roberts notes that even among the major textbooks of the P5, citation to 
domestic case law is overwhelmingly Western, limited to materials from certain core Western 
states, particularly those that are English-speaking.44 Whether in Western or non-Western 
textbooks, there is a lack of diversity in citation (99.6 per cent in the case of France!). Only 
Russian textbooks stood somewhat apart, with ‘only’ 29 per cent of citations to Western 
cases. Tellingly, a similar Western bias also predominates in the selection of academic 
authorities with Western, and, especially, English-speaking, authors being predominantly 
cited (although the French-speaking market refers primarily to French-speaking scholars).45  
I share with Roberts the view that such Western orientation does not exist merely as a 
matter of ‘facts on the ground’.46 Instead, and I believe correctly, she suggests that English-
language dominance, core-periphery dynamics, reasoning style and the simple availability of 
these decisions has led to their dominance.47 The linguistic duopoly of English and French 
                                                 
43 Roberts, supra note 1, at 32–33. 
44 Ibid., at 166–168. 
45 Ibid., at 172–177.  
46 Ibid., at 168. 
47 Ibid., at 168–170. E.g., the terse, condensed French style of judicial reasoning is rather less conducive to 
foreign citation than fully reasoned awards of German or English courts. 
14 
(and the increasing dominance of English as international law’s lingua franca48) deserves 
particular mention, going beyond mere textbooks and extending to her analysis of the 
profession. Roberts devotes considerable attention to actually studying the statistics involved 
in relation to the ICJ, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international courts 
and tribunals, illustrating how anglophone and francophone nationals from ‘core’ Western 
states dominate heavily. Going beyond textbooks into our profession for an illustration of this 
phenomenon, a striking feature of the arbitrators of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, where states are fully empowered to appoint arbitrators, is that 48 per 
cent are chosen from Western Europe and 21 per cent from North America, with British, 
French and US nationals being far better represented than all other nationalities.49 One further 
observes this trend in Roberts’ canvassing of the US and the UK academies as much as in 
how the Chinese and German academies are moving towards publishing in English.50 I have 
argued elsewhere that the use of language has concrete consequences. Perhaps more than any 
other Westernizing or globalizing phenomenon, the choice of language can confer a vehicular 
status on a language that privileges a certain mode of reasoning and certain categories of 
sources and enables the localism of certain parts of the world to present themselves as global 
in reach, reducing other views to being merely local.51 
I found when writing my own textbook that all of these features reflect international 
law’s past and, regrettably, its present. The past is a colonial, exploitative one in which the 
West imposed its values and its state system on the world; whether non-Western states came 
voluntarily to accept it is perhaps a secondary question, but it does not unsettle the reality of 
Western ideational pre-eminence. Even with an overt agenda to seek out non-Western 
sources of state practice, many efforts had to be made, and non-Western case law or 
executive/legislative practice were difficult to gather, even when looking at non-Western 
textbooks for inspiration (and, as with Roberts, my own linguistic limitations in Chinese, 
Russian and Hindi make it doubly difficult).  
                                                 
48 Ibid., at 260–267; see also the conclusion of de la Rasilla, supra note 19, at 166–167 in relation to the 
hegemony of English within the international law journal space. 
49 Roberts, supra note 1, at 259, referring to the work of Puig, ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’, 25 
EJIL (2014) 387, at 410–412. 
50 Roberts, supra note 1, at 218–219 (Germany), 231 (China). 
51 Ibid., at 267–268, citing Hernández, ‘On Multilingualism and the International Legal Process’, in H Ruiz-
Fabri, R Wolfrum and J Gogolin (eds), Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law (2010), 
vol. 2441, at 452. 
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Regrettably, these issues about Westernization seem to manifest across the global 
South, with Western sources being given implicit primacy and ‘local scholars’ ascribed 
secondary status,52 and the same is true of semi-peripheral Western states such as Australia 
and Canada with respect to British textbooks.53 Even in India, the few local textbooks expend 
little effort on even the local, much less the regional, experience.54 This broadly mirrors my 
own research looking for specific state practices outside ‘the core’, where only the occasional 
Canadian55 and South African56 textbooks provide focused guidance on local or regional 
practices. In this respect, Roberts is absolutely correct to conclude that looking to the West, 
and, in particular, to a few core states within it, signifies international law’s present in 
shaping an understanding of the field.57 Unless checked, this tendency will shape 
international law’s future.  
So what is the task of the textbook writer or educator, such as the many readers of this 
journal, especially those working in one of the ‘core’ English-speaking or Western states? 
Perhaps due to anxieties about international law’s fragility or its purpose, there are many of 
us who regard ourselves ‘on an educational mission: to disseminate knowledge about 
international law, this mission being required by international law itself’.58 Equally, certain 
scholars evince a noble desire to break free of such romanticism, pointing out the West’s 
hegemonic role in constituting international legal structures and seeking to decolonize the 
curriculum.59 Yet, to presume the universality and homogeneity of international law is 
Eurocentric, and the very structures of statehood, sovereignty, self-determination and even 
                                                 
52 Roberts, supra note 1, at 173, who explains a similar tendency in early Chinese international law textbooks. 
Regarding Latin America, see also Becker Lorca, ‘International Law in Latin America or Latin American 
International Law? Rise, Fall, and Retrieval of a Tradition of Legal Thinking and Political Imagination’, 47 
HILJ (2006) 283, at 288–289; de la Rasilla, supra note 19, at 145–147, also situated the rise of international law 
journals in Japan, Spain and the USA as rooted also in this vision of international law as a way to national 
integration in the core, by nurturing local scholarship and national practice. 
53 Roberts, supra note 1, at 152. 
54 Ibid., at 154. 
55 See, e.g., J.H. Currie et al., International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory (2nd edn, 2014); J.-M. Arbour 
and G. Parent, Droit international public (7th edn, 2017). 
56 See J. Dugard et al., International Law: A South African Perspective (4th edn, 2011); H. Strydom et al., 
International Law (2016). 
57 Roberts, supra note 1, at 166. 
58 D’Argent, ‘Teachers of International Law’, in J. d’Aspremont et al. (eds), International Law as a Profession 
(2017) 412, at 414–415; see also M Koskenniemi, ‘The Case for Comparative International Law’, Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law (2009) 1, at 3. 
59 See the spirited call from Schwöbel-Patel, ‘Teaching International Law Critically: Critical Pedagogy and 
Bildung as Orientations for Learning and Teaching’, in B. van Kline and U. de Vries (eds), Academic Learning 
in Law: Theoretical Positions, Teaching Experiments and Learning Experiences (2015) 99; Simpson, ‘On the 
Magic Mountain: Teaching International Law’, 10 EJIL (1999) 70.  
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human rights are historically contingent, rooted in the Western origins of international law.60 
There is, however, a further way forward and one that I would favour. As educators, I believe 
that we must honour our commitment to our students to educate oecumenically and to allow 
students to assemble the necessary tools beyond scholarship: to practise international law, to 
sit the exams of the foreign service or to work in the service of a political cause.  
To teach international law as it has been constituted and understood by international 
law elites over time, explaining and understanding its Eurocentric roots, serves to unmask 
those issues while understanding the inner logic of international law itself and understanding 
the language of international legal argument. These differing engagements with international 
law also merit scholarly engagement and also reflect the reality of how international law is 
lived. It provides, as Kennedy explains in an early work, ‘a good standpoint for thinking 
about the mechanisms by which modern scholars dissect, sanctify, justify, and, I fear, all too 
often forget about doctrine’.61 Roberts’ detailed empirical work on the dominant textbooks in 
the P5 states opens the door to rethinking the role of the educator in teaching international 
law. It brings a glimmer of light into how initiates are introduced into the profession that she 
calls the ‘divisible college’, perhaps her most controversial assertion, and to which we now 
turn. 
 
6 Great Power Dynamics in Roberts’ Divisible College 
 
Early in Is International Law International?, Roberts introduces her metaphor of the 
‘divisible college’, a play on Schachter’s memorable ‘invisible college of international 
lawyers’, a community of professionals that, ‘though dispersed throughout the world and 
engaged in diverse occupations, constitutes a kind of invisible college dedicated to a common 
intellectual enterprise. … its members are engaged in a continuous process of communication 
and collaboration’.62 Portraying the profession as a ‘divisible college’ reinforces, and is 
reinforced by, her call for a comparative international law methodology that permeates her 
book. There are several important dynamics at play in depicting international lawyers as a 
divisible college. Perhaps the most important is the core-periphery distinction raised early on 
in her book,63 but perhaps deployed somewhat indistinctly. Again, Roberts tends to use it 
                                                 
60 Koskenniemi, supra note 52, at 4. 
61 Kennedy, supra note 32, at 378. 
62 Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’, 72 Northwestern University Law Review (1977) 
217, at 217. 
63 Roberts, supra note 1, at 45ff. 
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simultaneously in terms of economic and geopolitical realities, the colonial-colonized 
dynamic, intra-Western dynamics and others. There are flows that are constituted beyond 
such dichotomies, and there are peripheral areas in core areas and so on. But no matter; 
perhaps it is best to illustrate the impact of the divisible college on those intra-disciplinary 
dynamics that are expressed in her book, both to point out the strengths in her argument as 
well as, perhaps, the limitations.  
Perhaps unavoidably, given the identity of the P5 members and her focus thereupon, 
Roberts’ attempt to delineate the divisible college raises several concerns. For example, when 
addressing the manner in which the different national traditions grapple with key issues of 
strategic national importance, Roberts explicitly calls for the reader to look at problems 
through the perspective of another and coolly seeks to let the evidence speak for itself, 
particularly when discussing the approaches of the West against those of Russia and China. 
In so doing, as Chasapis Tassinis points out, the book frames these international legal 
flashpoints ‘as essentially bilateral problems between different poles of geopolitical power’, 
with little recognition of the many states outside the P5 – including those immediately 
affected by these crises – and their responses.64 Roberts’ focus thus inadvertently reproduces 
the enduring myth of liberal humanitarianism (in the West) struggling against 
authoritarianism (in the non-West, the ‘Other’).65 Such a focus implies that authoritarian 
powers ought to be brought into line, rather than interrogating and identifying explicitly the 
root causes for divergence. To my mind, the interesting point is not that there is divergence, 
but rather, how that divergence is articulated through law and how law becomes a strategic 
tool in statecraft; this may have nothing to do with realist considerations, but instead, with the 
relative indeterminacy of international law itself.  
Regrettably, given her consciously descriptive approach, Roberts does not speak to 
this broader question at all. Let us turn to the two chapters, ‘Patterns of Difference and 
Dominance’ (Chapter 5) and ‘Disruptions Leading to a Competitive World Order’ (Chapter 
6), for illustrations. Chapter 5 highlights two issues of ‘high politics’ for the P5, the Russian 
intervention in the Crimea and the South China Sea arbitration66, in which the Russian and 
Chinese perspectives on international law are highlighted. Roberts concludes not only that the 
appraisal of the facts and media ‘representations of reality’ condition the divergent postures 
                                                 
64 Chasapis Tassinis, supra note 7, at 191. 
65 Ibid., at 190. 
66  South China Sea (the Philippines v China), PCA Case No 2013-19, Award (12 July 2016), 
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of both67 but also that there are certain ‘double standards’,68 compounded by a lack of ‘bridge 
lawyers’69 that link divergent communities.70 The point, however, is that the Russian and 
Chinese approaches are construed as ‘divergent’, with Western approaches implicitly taken 
as being the norm. However, this is not entirely accurate. Russia strategically invoked similar 
language to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) powers in Kosovo to justify 
humanitarian intervention in Crimea.71 And, crucially, the great majority of states have not 
accepted the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, whether in relation to NATO’s activities 
in Kosovo72 or to those of Russia in the Crimea.73 Again, when it comes to such case studies 
in the book, there is an ironic twist that emerges in Roberts’ choice to privilege the P5, in that 
it draws perhaps undue attention to the contemporary politics of the Great Powers, implying 
that it is their practice that is most relevant, to the near exclusion of all other states.74 
Turning then to the ‘startling’ unanimity of Chinese legal opinion in relation to 
China’s South China Sea dispute with the Philippines, Roberts articulates the well-known 
links between Chinese academia and government, suggesting moreover that Chinese 
scholars’ opinions ‘may be the result of a complex socialization process based on the way 
these scholars were educated, the reference materials that they common use … and the 
assumptions and boundaries that delimit mainstream academic debate within China’.75 These 
are ambitious normative claims that are to be taken seriously. But are they too complex an 
explanation, and do they miss the point in Julian Ku’s withering response: ‘I was (and 
remain) deeply skeptical of the subsequent Chinese argument … I think this is not just a 
different approach to international law arising out of distinct national or regional silos, but it 
is a weak, self-serving, politically necessary and ultimately ridiculous legal argument’?76 
                                                 
67 Roberts, supra note 1, at 236. 
68 Ibid., at 238. 
69 Ibid., at 239. 
70 M. Milanović’s blog post on Roberts’ book, ‘Mobility and Freedom in the International Legal Academia: A 
Comment on Anthea Roberts’ Is International Law International?’, Opinio Juris (8 February 2018), also points 
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71 See, e.g., ‘Overview of Security Council Meeting Record’, UN Doc S/PV.7125 (3 March 2014), 3ff. 
72 The foreign ministers of the G-77 (an informal group of 132 non-aligned states) denounced the humanitarian 
intervention doctrine as applied to Kosovo. See the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-Third Annual 
Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 (24 September 1999), para. 69. 
73 For a canvassing of reactions to Russia’s intervention, see Bering, ‘Lessons from Crimea’, 49 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Policy (2017) 746, at 775ff. 
74 I owe this observation to Chasapis Tassinis, supra note 7, at 191. 
75 Roberts, supra note 1, at 243. 
76 J. Ku, ‘Is International Law … Law’, Opinio Juris (9 February 2018).  
19 
Douglas Guilfoyle, another Westerner, gives an equally damning assessment of the Chinese 
Society of International Law’s ‘Critical Study’ of the arbitral award.77 Although Roberts’ 
portrayal of different traditions aims to highlight the potential for scholarly divergence, it 
insufficiently addresses the relationship between scholarship and power in relation to the two 
non-Western members of the UN Security Council. By consciously refusing to take a 
position, or by under-emphasizing her position, Roberts undermines her stated claim that 
comparativism need not entail relativism.  
Even more salient are her claims put forward in Chapter 6, suggesting that, as 
dominance patterns shift as a matter of fact, so will they shift as a matter of argument and 
within the community of international lawyers, thus fragmenting the formal universalism of 
international law.78 Roberts marshals on this point the language of the Sino-Russian Joint 
Declaration79 as to their shared vision of international law.80 The declaration ‘support[s] a 
vision of international law that is much more protective of sovereignty, sovereign equality, 
and territorial integrity than the apparently more human-rights-friendly and access-oriented 
approach embraced by many Western states’.81 And, yet, upon reading this chapter and the 
two case studies advanced (relating to humanitarian intervention and cyber-
security/information security), I felt two observations to be in order. The first is that the 
ideational divergence between China and Russia, on the one hand, and the Western powers, 
on the other, is a matter of degree and not of kind. Unlike with the Soviet visions of 
international law and even the New International Economic Order (NIEO) propounded by the 
newly independent states in the 1960s, the competing visions between different 
constituencies concern the interpretation of existing rules within an agreed framework. The 
Soviet vision of international law and NIEO were ruptures; they not only imagined new legal 
rules, but they also challenged and reimagined the very basis of the international legal frame.  
This does not negate Roberts’ emphasis on divergence, but it perhaps overstates the 
challenge to universality entailed by the divergence within the P5. This commonality 
represents, to a degree, the victory in our time of the international legal order centred on the 
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UN Charter (a positive or deeply problematic phenomenon, depending on one’s taste), a point 
that is under-explored in Roberts’ monograph. No one is arguing for amending the UN 
Charter with respect to humanitarian intervention, and a multilateral cyber-security treaty 
would be built on existing international law. Although it is evident that there has been some 
Chinese and, especially, Russian isolation in the face of the UN Security Council’s inaction 
in relation to the Syrian civil war, again it is in relation to whether the responsibility to 
protect should be invoked here and not whether the Council is competent or not competent to 
intervene in such cases. Roberts concedes as such, since China accepted the outcome of the 
2005 World Summit and Russia even invoked the responsibility-to-protect doctrine in 
support of its actions in Crimea.82 
The second issue raised in the ‘China and Russia versus the West’ narrative that 
Roberts inadvertently propounds is simply that it neglects the history of ‘Great Power’ 
politics. As Gerry Simpson’s seminal book highlights, history demonstrates a certain cyclical 
aspect as to how the state system has managed the relations between dominant powers, who 
use law to foster their strategic objectives; though international law evolves in response to 
shifts in power, these are not revolutionary upheavals but, rather, iterative adjustments.83 
Although Roberts accepts the point as a feature of the future development of the law, little 
space is devoted to considering whether the oscillation between hegemony, concert, and 
multi-polarity is an enduring feature of international law. This is perhaps unavoidable in light 
of Roberts’ generally ahistorical approach, but it has its limitations.  
Roberts’ arguments of patterns of dominance and difference will continue to ring true 
for as long as international law remains a reflection of power and international lawyers 
continue to engage with power. The question remains, however: is there another imagining of 
international law (and the international legal profession) that can transcend such questions? 
Roberts’ imagining of international lawyers in a ‘divisible college’ is her contribution to that 
debate, and it is to that concept that we now turn. 
 
7 The Divisible College and Dédoublement Professionnel 
 
The concept that will probably gain most traction in the profession is Roberts’ portrayal of 
international lawyers in a ‘divisible college’. This emphasis on divisibility creates an 
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‘[e]ssentially national partitioning’ of international lawyers, the resilience of the national 
organization of legal systems, university systems and career progression.84 None of this is 
inaccurate, but, in one respect, it sets up a false dichotomy when juxtaposed against the 
internationalism and disciplinary self-consciousness of international lawyers as an ‘invisible 
college’. Schachter’s invisible college had another important facet, itself a play on Georges 
Scelle’s dédoublement fonctionnel,85 unifying scholars, professional jurists and government 
legal advisers through a shared methodology and a battle against relativism through the 
‘reasoned application of competing principles, including those expressing fundamental 
values, validated by evidence of practice and consensus in international society’.86  
Given the potential for international law professionals to influence the interpretation 
and further development of substantive legal doctrines as well as institutional frameworks, 
does such mingling serve to amplify internationalist biases or simply to mitigate national or 
cultural biases?87 In an early work, Orford sought to illustrate a further facet of Schachter’s 
invisible college, suggesting that it promoted a narrative whereby international lawyers 
constitute an elite group that can affect history, powerful institutions and even states through 
their proximity to powerful institutions.88 The international lawyer in this portrayal does not 
hold power; rather, she acts alongside the deciders, facilitating and implementing their 
decisions and, in so doing, embodying Koskenniemi’s famous ‘gentle civilizer’. 
Despite the nuances in Roberts’ claims about the divisible college, I felt that 
Schachter’s observations about the mingling of roles are under-emphasized in her monograph 
and that something was lost. For international law derives so much of its importance from 
being the shared language of so many professionals, whatever their functions and 
responsibilities. This shared language is monopolized by the ‘invisible college’ – or our 
epistemic community of international lawyers – which sets the rules for engagement, 
establishes what counts as a relevant argument or is excluded. Each time international legal 
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arguments are performed and evaluated according to these rules, international law is 
reinforced as a relevant instrument and, specifically, as a legal language.89  
What does that international legal language demand? I believe that several 
overarching concepts transcend Roberts’ divisible overlapping communities, serving both to 
constitute and unify the invisible college through our engagement with, or resistance to, these 
concepts. Even as we might call for reform or resistance, we international lawyers commit to 
a description of international law with the sovereign state as the locus of sovereignty and to 
its control of public power on the international plane. International law, in this conception, is 
an instrument to regulate the power exercised by these sovereign states on the international 
plane. However unjust, inefficient or oppressive, international law as it exists favours order 
and certainty in the legal order regulating the relations between states. Whatever our national 
attributes or cultural divergences in this respect, international lawyers as a profession are 
unified by this shared disciplinary sensibility and by our understanding of the place of 
international law within global society. To my mind, this disciplinary sensibility is far more 
powerful than Roberts’ ‘divisible college’ metaphor would suggest. My concern remains that, 
for all of its obvious appeal and descriptive purchase, stretching the divisible college’ 
metaphor too far turns attention away from these discursive structures that shape international 
law and vest it with very real power on the global plane. Comparative international law, 
though purporting to provide an antidote to unduly universalist claims about international 
law, remains but a critique of universalism, and should not be taken as providing for its 
replacement. 
 
8 Concluding Thoughts 
 
International law does not change of its own volition; it is neither sentient nor conscious. It is 
international lawyers, whether acting through institutions such as states and international 
organizations or through their own writings, practices or actions, who do so. As individual 
international lawyers, we are shaped and constituted by the very discipline that we have 
sought to join, that has been inculcated into us and that has granted us admission. The 
professional project or shared enterprise that is international law becomes the object of our 
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engagement but shapes our own participation within it and our identity as international 
lawyers.90 We are – profession and international legal system – co-constituted. 
Roberts’ monograph represents an ambitious sociology of our profession, with all of 
the necessary limitations of a 400-page monograph devoted primarily to the practices in five 
powerful states, and her own personal situating as a privileged, anglophone Westerner. It is 
an imaginative, heterodox work that challenges the very foundations of our profession. Her 
overriding purpose is to deny that any international lawyer can understand all aspects of the 
field from all viewpoints: ‘The best that international lawyers can do is attempt to become 
conscious of some of the frames that shape their understandings of and approaches to the 
field and be aware of how these might be similar to and different from those of others’.91 It is 
a call for pluralism, comparativism and a degree of subjectivism to focus on how the diverse 
elements of our divisible, invisible college of international lawyers operate together. All of 
these assertions, when justified as carefully and modestly as she has done, merit careful 
reflection from all of us. 
It would be churlish to chide Roberts for being insufficiently counter-hegemonic, as 
this is not her own endeavour. She herself closes off the discussions of her book in 
EJIL:Talk! and the Opinio Juris blog with a nod to Saskia Sassen’s ‘Before Methods’ 
approach to ‘destabilize our existing understandings of the world and the conceptual 
frameworks we use to describe it … to sketch and project, and to connect microobservations 
to macroforces in an iterative observational and analytical process’.92 This is analytically 
prior to other projects, aiming to set the scene for more political, emancipatory projects. 
Instead, her proclaimed aim, ostensibly shared with Koskenniemi, is no more and no less than 
to situate international lawyers in two communities: ‘[U]niversal and particular at the same 
time, speaking a shared language but doing that from their own, localizable standpoint.’93 She 
regards the role of international lawyers as a discursive bridge, passing back and forth to 
facilitate interaction and understanding between the national and transnational: ‘One might 
not always like what those in other communities have to say and one may view their values 
as a threat to one’s own. But failing to listen and engage is dangerous in its own right and 
may lead to a stronger backlash in the longer term.’94  
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Perhaps there is promise in precisely that approach, allowing the reader to infuse their 
own conclusions after presenting the facts in a purportedly objective, detached manner. This 
is not a book in favour of a policy shift or a specific interpretation of the law; this is a book 
favouring a specific interpretation of a field of human endeavour. It describes and maps out 
structures of intellectual and discursive power in a way that our field sorely needs, and it 
gives the teeth for more politicized, explicitly normative projects about how to reshape 
international legal scholarship, the international profession and the substance of international 
law itself. For this reason, it is a welcome addition to the continued debates about the place of 
the international legal profession. 
But it is not the last word. Roberts’ comparativist framing of the international legal 
profession is to emphasize difference and diversity. As a descriptive exercise, this has its 
value; but what happens when international law swings into operation and must be applied to 
genuine situations – for example, in a dispute before the ICJ, in a standoff in the UN Security 
Council or in a complex treaty negotiation between states? Can it fully articulate whether 
international has a structural bias or how this bias will operate? Can comparativism predict 
solutions based on international law, or does it reduce these purely to cultural relativism and 
hegemonic/core-periphery power dynamics? In our emphasis on diversity and divergence, do 
we lose sight of those commonalities that indeed bind the invisible college? May the debates 
long continue. 
 
 
